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ALD-148        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3373 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL CRAWFORD, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-01545) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
March 26, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 15, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Crawford is a federal prisoner serving a sentence imposed in 1993 by the  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which sentenced 
him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Crawford unsuccessfully challenged 
his convictions and sentence on direct appeal and in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 
his sentencing court. 
 At issue here is a proceeding that Crawford initiated in the district of his 
confinement by filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Crawford argued that 
the use of certain prior state-court drug offenses to enhance his federal sentence was 
rendered impermissible by Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), and 
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011).  Crawford conceded that he 
could not raise his claim in another § 2255 motion, but he argued that he could resort to § 
2241 under In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997).  In that case, we held that § 
2241 was available to a defendant whose statute of conviction was later interpreted in a 
way that rendered his conduct non-criminal and who had no prior opportunity to raise 
that issue.  See id. at 251; see also United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246-47 (3d Cir. 
2013) (applying Dorsainvil).   
 The District Court held that Crawford’s claim does not qualify under the narrow 
Dorsainvil exception and dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction on October 19, 
2012.  Crawford did not appeal.  Instead, and over a year and a half later, he filed a 
purported reply to the Government’s response to his habeas petition.  Crawford appeared 
to believe that the District Court had not yet ruled on his habeas petition, and he argued 
that his Carachuri-Rosendo claim was further supported by Descamps v. United States, 
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133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and subsequent Fourth Circuit authority.  When the Government 
responded that the District Court already had dismissed Crawford’s petition, Crawford 
filed a reply asserting that he never received notice of the District Court’s ruling and 
requesting that the District Court reopen his habeas proceeding to consider his argument 
under Descamps.  The District Court then reopened the proceeding for the limited 
purpose of addressing Crawford’s filings, and it directed its Clerk to re-send its opinion 
and order to Crawford and then re-close the case.  Crawford appeals.   
  Crawford’s post-judgment filings are best construed as a motion for relief from the 
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  Although the District Court did not address 
Crawford’s request to reopen the judgment on the basis of Descamps, its order re-closing 
the case implicitly denies that request.  See United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 291 
(3d Cir. 2014).  A certificate of appealability is not required to review a final decision in 
a § 2241 proceeding, and we thus have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Vasquez 
v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 2012).  Our review is limited to the denial of Rule 
60(b) relief and does not extend to the District Court’s underlying order dismissing 
Crawford’s habeas petition because “an appeal from the denial of Rule 60(b) relief does 
not bring up the underlying judgment for review.”  Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 
U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978).1  We review the denial of Rule 60(b) relief for abuse of 
                                              
1 Crawford claims that he did not receive notice of the District Court’s order dismissing 
his petition, and lack of such notice potentially states a ground to reopen the time to 
appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).  Reopening the time to appeal requires an actual 
motion and not merely a notice of appeal, however, and none of Crawford’s post-
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discretion.  See Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 83 USLW 
3352 (Mar. 23, 2014) (No. 14-531).   
 Although the District Court did not explain why it rejected Crawford’s request to 
reopen his § 2241 proceeding on the basis of Descamps, we will affirm because 
Crawford’s motion states no conceivable basis for relief.  Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is 
appropriate “only in extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme 
and unexpected hardship would occur.”  Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (quotation marks omitted).  
Crawford’s request to reopen on the basis of Descamps does not qualify for three reasons.   
 First, intervening changes in the law rarely constitute extraordinary circumstances, 
see id. at 121, and Descamps does not even represent an intervening change in the law.  
In that case, the Court addressed the categorical and modified categorical approaches for 
determining whether a prior conviction constitutes an “violent felony” as defined in the 
Armed Career Criminal Act.  See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281-82.  The Court 
reaffirmed that its existing precedent, including Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), permits application of the 
modified categorical approach only when a statute is divisible and then only to determine 
the subpart under which the defendant was convicted.  See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281-
                                                                                                                                                  
judgment filings asked the District Court to reopen his time to appeal.  See Poole v. Fam. 
Ct., 368 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2004).  Even if they had, the District Court would have 
lacked the authority to reopen the appeal period because Crawford did not submit the first 
of those filings within 180 days of the District Court’s order.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(6)(B); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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82.  In doing so, the Court reversed a lower court’s misapplication of the modified 
categorical approach as inconsistent with Taylor and Shepard.  See id. at 2282-86.  Thus, 
“[t]he Supreme Court in Descamps explained that it was not announcing a new rule, but 
was simply reaffirming the Taylor/Shepard approach, which some courts had 
misconstrued.”  United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Ezell 
v. United States, — F.3d —, No. 14-71696, 2015 WL 294306, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 
2015) (denying authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion because, inter 
alia, “[t]he Supreme Court did not announce a new rule in Descamps”). 
 Second, and even if Descamps had changed the law, it would not have done so in a 
relevant way because Descamps has no bearing on Crawford’s Carachuri-Rosendo claim 
or the availability of relief on that claim under § 2241.  Crawford initially claimed that he 
is no longer a career offender by reason of his prior drug convictions because, under 
Carachuri-Rosendo, those convictions resulted in “little or no” prison time and thus did 
not constitute felonies as defined in the Controlled Substance Act.  In support of his 
argument under Descamps, by contrast, Crawford argues that certain of his other (and 
unspecified) convictions no longer constitute violent felonies under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act when properly considered under the categorical and modified categorical 
approaches.  That issue has nothing to do with Crawford’s initial claim and thus does not 
call into question the District Court’s dismissal of that claim. 
 Finally, Crawford did not assert a colorable independent claim under Descamps, 
let alone one that might fall within the narrow Dorsainvil exception permitting resort to § 
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2241.  Crawford has not specified which prior convictions his sentencing court 
determined were violent felonies or why he believes that those convictions do not 
constitute violent felonies under the categorical or modified categorical approaches.  
Crawford thus has provided no reason to believe that his sentence as a career offender is 
now erroneous under Descamps.  He also has provided no reason to believe that this 
sentencing issue represents the kind of miscarriage of justice permitting resort to § 2241.  
Cf. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a claim 
of sentencing error under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), did not fit within 
Dorsainvil because Apprendi did not render the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal). 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
